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In the past decade, neuroimaging research has begun to identify key brain regions involved
in self-referential processing, most consistently midline structures such as the poste-
rior cingulate cortex (PCC). The majority of studies have employed cognitive tasks such
as judgment about trait adjectives or mind wandering, that have been associated with
increased PCC activity. Conversely, tasks that share an element of present-centered atten-
tion (being “on task”), ranging from working memory to meditation, have been associated
with decreased PCC activity. Given the complexity of cognitive processes that likely con-
tribute to these tasks, the specific contribution of the PCC to self-related processes still
remains unknown. Building on this prior literature, recent studies have employed sam-
pling methods that more precisely link subjective experience to brain activity, such as
real-time fMRI neurofeedback. This recent work suggests that PCC activity may repre-
sent a sub-component cognitive process of self-reference – “getting caught up in” one’s
experience. For example, getting caught up in a drug craving or a particular viewpoint.
In this paper, we will review evidence across a number of different domains of cognitive
neuroscience that converges in activation and deactivation of the PCC including recent
neurophenomenological studies of PCC activity using real-time fMRI neurofeedback.
Keywords: defaultmode network, real-time fMRI,meditation, posterior cingulate cortex, self-referential processing,
mind wandering, resting state, craving
INTRODUCTION
Over a decade ago, using the simple task instruction of “lie still and
don’t do anything in particular,” Raichle et al. (2001) discovered
that the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) was functionally coupled
with other brain regions now considered the default mode net-
work (DMN). Numerous studies have since implicated the PCC
in a host of functions ranging from those that elicit activation
such as mind wandering, social cognition, and drug craving, to
those that elicit deactivation such as focused attention and med-
itation. Many of these studies have interpreted the findings in
terms of the PCC being involved in self-related aspects of cognitive
processing. However, it is still unclear what aspects of the “self”
are processed in the PCC. Given the growing body of evidence
on PCC function from different domains, including self-related
processing, social cognition, and addiction, among others, it may
now be possible to identify potential phenomenological descrip-
tors that are common across domains. In this paper, we propose
that PCC activity may be related to a cognitive process of being
“attached to” or “caught up” in one’s experience. We will describe
being “caught up” in experience, and then discuss evidence from
cognitive and clinical neuroscience that provides a basis for this
hypothesis. We will first discuss findings that PCC activation is
related to being “caught up in” experience, including self-related
and social cognitive processing, disruption of attention, and crav-
ing. We will then discuss findings that PCC deactivation is related
to not being “caught up in” experience, including present-centered
awareness or attention. For the purpose of this review, we will
focus on a specific functionally defined sub-region of the PCC
most associated with the DMN (Leech et al., 2012), though this
brain region likely supports other cognitive functions as well.
Additionally, we will focus our discussion on studies measuring
activity rather than functional connectivity; though the latter is
related in an important way, it is beyond the scope of this paper
and has been recently reviewed elsewhere (e.g., Whitfield-Gabrieli
and Ford, 2012). Finally, we will explore PCC activity as a pos-
sible marker of getting “caught up in” experience, pointing to a
likely larger network of brain regions involved in this cognitive
process.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE “CAUGHT UP IN” EXPERIENCE?
We have all been caught up in experience – whether positive or
negative. This can happen when we have a disagreement with a
loved one or colleague that goes on and on to the point where
we don’t even remember what we were arguing about – we get
attached to a certain viewpoint, or even just “being right” and
can’t let go no matter how ridiculous the argument becomes. We
can also get caught up in something by being pulled into our
experience; for example, we start an internet search for some-
thing, get distracted by something else that looks interesting, then
something else, and on and on until we find that we are on some
random website and don’t remember how we got there. Though
there are likely differences between getting caught up in positive
or negative experiences, there may be a shared experiential com-
ponent; we will include both of these in the broader category of
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getting caught up in experience as a first pass at identifying neural
correlates therein. In fact, there is precedent for brain regions sub-
serving oppositely valenced affective experience, as has been seen
in previous studies of appetitive and aversive stimuli (Carlezon
and Thomas, 2009).
Being caught up in experience can be noticeable; for instance
we notice that we contract when someone is yelling at us. At other
times, the experience of being caught up may be subtle, or we may
be so engrossed – as is with the case of daydreaming – that we aren’t
aware that we are caught up until after the experience has passed.
Though being caught up in experience may be common from an
experiential standpoint, from a neuroscientific framework, it likely
involves a number of overlapping cognitive processes, including
self-referential/internally oriented networks, emotion processing,
social cognition, and evaluative/judgment systems among others.
As each of these systems in turn involves complex networks of
brain regions, it may be helpful to look across multiple cogni-
tive domains to identify a common experiential element. Is the
PCC a good candidate brain region to begin this exploration?
In the following sections, we will give brief experiential exam-
ples of being caught up in one’s experience, and explore related
cognitive domains and their convergence in neural activation
patterns.
PCC ACTIVATION IS RELATED TO BEING CAUGHT UP IN
MENTAL CONTENT
PCC ACTIVITY IS ASSOCIATED WITH SELF-RELATED PROCESSING
What is it like if someone asks if you think you’re “outgoing,”
“patient,” or “nosy”? Are we attached to certain concepts of
ourselves? Do we get caught up in these evaluations? What is this
experience like and how does this map onto our brain activity?
Aside from studies of the resting state, perhaps the best-studied
category of cognitive tasks that activate the PCC are those involv-
ing self-related processing. Early work by Kelley et al. (2002)
used a simple task of presenting trait adjectives to subjects dur-
ing fMRI and asking “Does the adjective describe you?” (“self”
condition), or for comparison, “Does the adjective describe cur-
rent U.S. President George Bush?” (“other” condition). Relatively
greater PCC activity was found for the “self” as compared to the
“other” condition (Kelley et al., 2002). These findings have been
since replicated (e.g., Heatherton et al., 2006) and extended using
other sensory modalities such as aural presentation of adjectives
(Johnson et al., 2002) or reflective self-awareness of personal-
ity and physical appearance (Kjaer et al., 2002). A meta-analysis
performed by Northoff et al. (2006) concluded that midline struc-
tures including the PCC and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)
comprise a “core,” “mental,” or “minimal” self (Northoff et al.,
2006).
In this meta-analysis (Northoff et al., 2006), Northoff also
speculated that overlap between self-referential and resting state
processing should include predominantly interoceptive stimuli.
This assertion has gained empirical support in recent years. For
example, studies using experience sampling have found that close
to 50% of waking life is spent mind wandering to past and future
events (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Mind wandering has
been shown to activate the PCC (Weissman et al., 2006; Mason
et al., 2007) as do cognitive tasks that elicit future oriented thinking
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). These findings suggest that there is
an experiential default mode (mind wandering) associated with
PCC activity. Bringing these findings together, Whitfield-Gabrieli
et al. (2011) directly compared task-independent resting state with
task-dependent self-related processing during evaluation of trait
adjectives and found a distinct convergence of brain activations in
the PCC and mPFC.
Most studies of self-related processing find activations in both
the PCC and mPFC, brain regions that have also been shown to
be tightly functionally coupled (Fox et al., 2005; Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2010). Anatomical and functional studies have begun to
distinguish the roles of the PCC and mPFC in self-related process-
ing. For example, the mPFC appears to integrating information
gathered from the internal and external environment and relay it
to the PCC (Ongur and Price, 2000; Ongur et al., 2003). Func-
tional imaging studies of the classic hallucinogen psilocybin have
found that psilocybin leads to decreased functional coupling of the
PCC and mPFC and increased coupling between the mPFC and
task-positive brain regions such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex (dlPFC) (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012). Psilocybin ingestion is
reported to induce an “egoless” or “selfless” state where the bound-
ary between self and other is blurred. One interpretation of these
findings is that decreased coupling between the PCC and mPFC
with psilocybin corresponds with the subjective experience of a
less egoic state, or less “self.”
However, recent meta-analyses by Legrand and Ruby (2009)
and Qin and Northoff (2011) have suggested that a more subtle
process than just the subjective experience of “self” may be occur-
ring in the PCC. Legrand and Ruby suggested that familiarity with
an object might drive PCC activation rather than self-reference.
Qin directly tested this by comparing results from imaging studies
of self, familiarity, other, and rest. Interestingly, all four categories
showed PCC activation! When contrasted, the self category showed
robust mPFC activation relative to familiarity, other, and rest,
suggesting that there may be a specific cognitive aspect of self-
referential processing that is mediated by the mPFC. So what do
these four task categories have in common? Agreeing with Legrand
and Ruby, Qin suggested that regions such as the PCC may serve
as a general evaluation or judgment system.
Consistent with this interpretation, additional self-related pro-
cessing tasks that may tap into the construct of evaluation or
judgment have been found to elicit PCC activity. For example,
Johnson et al. (2006) compared reflection on promotion goals
(make good things happen) and prevention goals (keep bad things
from happening) and found that the PCC was activated by both
conditions, but more so by prevention goals. In a related study,
Strauman et al. (2012) found that prevention goal priming was
specifically associated with PCC activity irrespective of the degree
of negative valence of the prompt. If not negative valence, what
is it about prevention goals that preferentially activates the PCC?
Johnson speculated that PCC activity may be more related to dif-
ferences in social significance, representational context, or aspects
of subjective experience of self, among others. Another study used
a self-evaluation task in which individuals chose between two
music CDs that they had previously rated as equivalent, and then
reported on how much they liked the chosen CD (a phenomenon
termed “choice justification”). PCC activity was associated with an
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increase in liking for chosen CDs, but not a decrease in liking for
rejected CDs (Salmoirago-Blotcher et al., 2013). Again, the valence
of self-related processing did not specifically relate to PCC activity.
Together these studies support Legrand and Ruby and Qin’s
suggestions that evaluation or judgment of experience may be
represented in PCC activation – “ought to” goals are often more
evaluative than promotion goals, and this may be similar to choice
justification, where we get caught up in defending our choices,
even to ourselves. If evaluation or judgment overlaps with being
caught up in experience, it may provide a parsimonious explana-
tion for how these findings line up with the decreased functional
coupling found with psilocybin – the mPFC may subserve more
cognitive elements of self, while the PCC functions to evaluate
or judge how one relates to one’s experience: how much they are
caught up in it. If this is the case, this relational aspect should find
overlap with other domains of experience.
PCC ACTIVITY IS ASSOCIATED WITH SOCIAL COGNITIVE PROCESSING
What is it like when we see a co-worker take credit for another’s
work? What is it like when someone asks us for spare change on
the street? Is there a common social cognitive process whereby we
get caught up in moral dilemmas?
Recent work in cognitive neuroscience has demonstrated a role
for the PCC in social processing, such as mentalizing, evalua-
tive judgments, and sensitivity to moral issues, among others.
A recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies in social cog-
nition (Sperduti et al., 2012) found consistent PCC activation
related to internal and external agency attribution, perspective tak-
ing, observing social interactions, self-related thinking, and causal
attribution of social events. For example, a study by van Veen et al.
(2009) used an induced compliance procedure in which subjects
made a series of false statements to mislead an innocent person
to generate cognitive dissonance, and found activity in the dorsal
anterior cingulate, anterior insula, and PCC, possibly represent-
ing cognitive conflict, negative emotional arousal, and self-related
processing, respectively. In another fMRI study (Arsenault et al.,
2013), PCC activity correlated with attributional evaluation pro-
cessing of valenced sentences describing socially relevant everyday
situations, more so in the right PCC for positive sentences, and
more so in the left PCC for negative sentences. These findings
suggest that PCC activity is related to social evaluation.
Another aspect of social cognitive processing shown to engage
the PCC is moral dilemma, which may be distinguished as issues
related to care, such as benevolence, compassion, and the desire
to liberate others from need, or related to justice, such as fair-
ness, impartiality, and the desire to liberate others from injustice.
Caceda et al. (2011) presented story segments designed to evoke
moral dilemma and found partial neural segregation between care,
justice, and neutral issues. The PCC, among other regions, was
implicated in processing of both care and justice issues relative to
neutral issues. The authors suggested that the purported role of
the PCC in autobiographical memory is that interpretive aware-
ness of care issues in moral conflict may be informed by memories
of past moral situations, decisions, and outcomes, as well as self-
awareness, personal beliefs, and positive emotions. Relatedly, for
justice issues, the PCC may modulate predictive social perceptions.
Morey et al. (2012) studied guilt and social consequence, and
found that the PCC, among other regions, was more strongly acti-
vated for actions leading to harm to others relative to oneself, and
suggest that actions involving guilt may lead to greater preoccupa-
tion with self-actions rather than thoughts about harm caused to
others.
These studies suggest that the PCC plays a role in a range of
social situations. What is common between moral dilemmas, jus-
tice issues, and guilt, among others? What is the experience like
when we are faced with moral issues regarding ourselves or others,
or guilt that may come as a consequence of our actions? Perhaps
similar to self-related processing, there is an element of men-
tal clenching around or being caught up in the experience. It is
interesting to note that this appears to occur even for imagined
scenarios, such as those in the fMRI studies discussed here.
PCC ACTIVITY IS ASSOCIATED WITH DISRUPTION OF ATTENTION
What is it like to be interrupted by a text or email notification on
your cell phone or computer?
A general task-related decrease of PCC activity has been reported
(e.g., Greicius et al., 2003), and task-related increases in PCC
activity have been found during lapses of attention. For exam-
ple, Eichele et al. (2008) found that PCC activity predicts response
errors in flanker tasks, and Esposito et al. (2006) found a signal
increase and spatial decrease of the PCC activation with working
memory load.
Relatedly, PCC activity has been associated with poorer task
performance (Wen et al., 2013). For example, increased PCC activ-
ity has been associated with lapses in attention that affect task
performance, such as in trials preceding errors in a go/no-go task
(Li et al., 2007) or with increased reaction time in a demanding task
(Weissman et al., 2006; Hinds et al., 2013). In these studies, PCC
activity leading to distraction from task performance may reflect
mind wandering (Mason et al., 2007). Weissman et al., found that
just prior to lapses in attention, the PCC showed increased activ-
ity, possibly indicating a shift from the external world to internal
mentation. Using real-time fMRI, Hinds et al., found that present-
ing stimuli during relatively increased DMN activation resulted in
significantly slower reaction time compared to presentation dur-
ing greater activation in the supplementary motor cortex. Another
study by Otten and Rugg (2001) used an incidental learning task to
study unsuccessful memory encoding, and found greater activa-
tion in the PCC and other regions during subsequently forgotten
words.
These studies provide evidence for a correlation between
increased PCC activity and poorer task performance. With regard
to the actual subjective experience of mind wandering or lapses in
attention, it is possible that when attention is pulled away from a
task, this may manifest as being caught up in the experience, with
associated increases in PCC activity.
PCC ACTIVITY IS ASSOCIATED WITH CRAVING
What is it like to crave a piece of chocolate?
Craving, perhaps one of the most obvious experiences of being
caught up in experience, is described clinically and experimen-
tally in terms of desire, urge, want, and need (Tiffany and Wray,
2012); it has been associated with PCC activity in smoking and
drug addiction. For example, Brody et al. (2007) showed that
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smokers resisting cue-induced craving strongly engage the PCC.
Similarly, preferential processing of smoking cessation messages
highly tailored to the smoker was associated with PCC activity
(Chua et al., 2009), possibly in part because the messages were
self-related and/or personally meaningful (which also may be more
effective at inducing craving). In a case study, a lesion to the PCC
led to a disruption of the individual’s nicotine addiction, reported
as an immediate loss of cigarette craving, with no urge to smoke at
all (Jarraya et al., 2010). Related to this, a larger lesion study (Naqvi
et al., 2007) found that smokers with damage to the insula were
more likely to quit smoking, associated with loss of urge to smoke,
and another study found that increased connectivity between the
PCC and the insula in smokers may be attenuated by anti-smoking
medications (Carim-Todd et al., 2013).
The relationship between PCC activity and craving has also
been reported in studies of drug addiction. In a study by Garavan
et al. (2000), cocaine users and cocaine-naïve individuals watched
videos of two men smoking crack cocaine to induce cocaine crav-
ing during fMRI, leading to activations in the PCC among other
regions in cocaine users but not controls. PCC activation was also
found in response to watching an evocative sexual video, but not
in response to watching a nature video, suggesting that the normal
endogenous drive state or craving response may be seated in the
PCC (Garavan et al., 2000).
Related to our introductory example of chocolate craving,
Yokum and Stice (2013) found reduced activity in the PCC when
individuals were asked to think about the long term costs or bene-
fits of eating or not eating and attempt to suppress food cravings,
though in this paradigm, it may be difficult to distinguish con-
tributions of the PCC to being “on task” vs. suppressing cravings.
Overall, the PCC appears to be involved in aspects of craving, as
shown by functional neuroimaging and lesion studies in a num-
ber of contexts including smoking, drug addiction, food, and sex.
As craving has been specifically described as being caught up in
an experience, it may provide the most direct evidence for how
being caught up may activate the PCC. With all of these cognitive
domains converging in PCC activation, are there opposing cogni-
tive domains that deactivate the PCC, providing complementary
evidence for its role in getting caught up in experience?
PCC DEACTIVATION IS RELATED TO PRESENT-CENTERED AWARENESS
OR ATTENTION
What is it like to be mindful of the present moment, to allow
thoughts to arise without getting caught up in them?
The previous sections have laid out a number of different cog-
nitive experiences that modulate PCC activity. We now turn to
studies that show PCC deactivation related to present-centered
awareness or attention. In addition to general task-related PCC
deactivation, a role for the PCC in getting caught up in experience
is supported by the deactivation of this brain region during tasks
specifically designed to “not get caught up” such as focused atten-
tion or meditation. For example, McKiernan et al. (2003) found
that the magnitude of task-induced PCC deactivation increased
with task difficulty. Similarly, Wen et al. (2013) found that mean
PCC BOLD signal is negatively correlated with accuracy in a spa-
tial visual attention task. Meditation, operationalized for the fMRI
setting, may be considered a form of focused attention toward the
present moment and away from mind wandering and self-related
thinking. In work from our research group, we have found that
three types of meditation practices specifically deactivate the PCC
in experienced meditators as compared to novices (Brewer et al.,
2011). In this study, meditators also reported less mind wandering
during meditation than novices. Based on these earlier findings,
we have conducted real-time fMRI neurofeedback studies in which
we have found that real-time feedback from the PCC corresponds
to the subjective experience of mind wandering (increased PCC
activity) and focused attention (decreased PCC activity) in med-
itators and novices, and that meditators are able to volitionally
decrease a feedback graph representing PCC activity (Garrison
et al., 2013b). Pagnoni (2012) also reported less mind wandering
in meditators, as well as a lower relative incidence of elevated PCC
activity and better performance on a visual attention task.
A particular advantage of real-time fMRI neurofeedback over
standard offline analysis is that it captures variability within blocks
of time that would traditionally be regressed to a mean. As cog-
nitive states fluctuate significantly over the course of a 1–3 min
block, these transient changes can now be more precisely linked to
brain activity to improve characterization therein. We have begun
to test the specific hypothesis that the PCC is involved in getting
caught up in mental content, using neurophenomenological stud-
ies of real-time feedback from the PCC in experienced meditators.
In a recent study (Garrison et al., 2013a) meditators were asked
to meditate for short (1 min) real-time fMRI runs with feedback
from the PCC and immediately report their experience during
the meditation. Meditators performed focused attention on the
breath meditation while viewing a dynamic feedback graph repre-
senting percent signal change in the PCC relative to a baseline task,
and were asked to describe their experience during the meditation
after each run. Feedback graphs paired with self-reports were ana-
lyzed using grounded theory to derive specific testable hypotheses
about how PCC activity corresponds to the subjective experience
of meditation. Overall, we found that the subjective experience
of “undistracted awareness” and “effortless doing” corresponded
with PCC deactivation, and “distracted awareness” and “control-
ling” corresponded with PCC activation. Specifically related to the
current review, in many cases meditators reported instances of
mind wandering that did not lead to PCC activity, suggesting that
the PCC may be involved in something more than the thoughts
themselves, such as getting caught up in experience, as suggested
by the studies described above.
For example, during a real-time feedback run in which a med-
itator was asked to increase a feedback graph representing PCC
activity, the meditator described being unable to elicit PCC activ-
ity by mind wandering: “I was trying to envision that I had a
lot of work to do today . . . It didn’t work” (Figure 1A). Another
meditator when trying to activate her PCC reported: “I decided
to picture wedding plans and so I started off thinking about my
wedding and how I wanted to look good and then it just started
to go blue. I switched to babies and I thought, ‘I want babies’
and I think that might correlate with a little red blip but then I
couldn’t sustain it . . . I’m wondering if I’m focusing so much that
it’s just going blue because I’m focusing but I can’t get, I can’t
get the self to kick in when I’m told to” (Figure 1B). In another
run, the same meditator reported: “I tried to think about what
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of real-time neurofeedback from the PCC in
meditators. Graphs show percent signal change in the PCC relative to
an active baseline task. (A) “I was trying to envision that I had a lot of
work to do today . . . It didn’t work.” (B) “I decided to picture wedding
plans and so I started off thinking about my wedding and how I wanted
to look good and then it just started to go blue. I switched to babies and I
thought, ‘I want babies’ and I think that might correlate with a little red
blip but then I couldn’t sustain it . . . I’m wondering if I’m focusing so
much that it’s just going blue because I’m focusing but I can’t get, I can’t
get the self to kick in when I’m told to.” (C) “I tried to think about what
was the thing that agitated me most and I thought it was [a certain
person] and so I started thinking about her and I, at first it was just the
name and I dropped into blue and so and then I started conjuring up
images of [my boyfriend] with her and it super spiked and then it just
took a lot of effort so then I had to drop it. And I just kept trying to pick it
up a little bit which I think correlates with the kind of like final two spikes,
the kind of final two points in the red. Although, it was just so much
energy, I couldn’t sustain it, which was why I couldn’t keep that really
high spike going . . . I couldn’t sustain it and so that kind of correlates
with not being able to hold on to that throughout.”
was the thing that agitated me most and I thought it was [a cer-
tain person] and so I started thinking about her and I, at first
it was just the name and I dropped into blue and so and then I
started conjuring up images of [my boyfriend] with her and it
super spiked [red] and then it just took a lot of effort so then
I had to drop it. And I just kept trying to pick it up a little bit
which I think correlates with the kind of like final two spikes, the
kind of final two points in the red. Although, it was just so much
energy, I couldn’t sustain it, which was why I couldn’t keep that
really high spike going . . . I couldn’t sustain it and so that kind
of correlates with not being able to hold on to that throughout”
(Figure 1C).
As highlighted by these examples, a common theme that
emerged from this study was that getting caught up in expe-
rience (e.g., “hold on”) rather than the content of experience
itself increases PCC activity whereas present-centered awareness
of mental content decreases PCC activity. Taken together, attention
tasks when externally focused, studies of various types of medi-
tation, and even a mindful stance toward an object (Taylor et al.,
2011) suggest more precisely that PCC activity decreases when one
becomes less caught up in ones experience, providing complemen-
tary evidence to studies showing its increase with tasks that elicit
the opposite.
SUMMARY
The PCC seems to be involved in a number of modes of
experience – for example, it is activated with evident experiences
of getting caught up such as craving, and more subtle experiences
of getting caught up, such as identifying with or being attached to
attributes of ourselves. This hypothesized role for the PCC is also
supported by data showing that the PCC decreases in activity when
we are not caught up in experience, whether being focused on a
task or meditating. Though we have brought together data from
many realms of cognitive neuroscience to support this hypothesis,
we by no means offer it as a definitive explanation, but instead an
invitation for exploration and dialog; still no studies to our knowl-
edge exist that directly test a role for the PCC in getting caught up
in experience.
Given the growing evidence for the interconnected network
nature of the brain, the PCC likely serves as a sentinel marker or
as a node within a network of brain regions that together support
or represent getting caught up in experience, for example, as a
sub-component process of the DMN, rather than functioning in
isolation. Such markers are helpful for then identifying and char-
acterizing the networks that they represent. Studies using direct
intracranial EEG recording have already begun to provide comple-
mentary neurophysiological data linking DMN activity to gamma
frequency ranges (Jerbi et al., 2010; Dastjerdi et al., 2011; Ossan-
don et al., 2011; Foster et al., 2012). These and other modalities
such as neurophenomenological methods are needed to directly
assess how the being caught up in experience relates to PCC
activity, to confirm and/or refine this and other plausible hypothe-
ses that link PCC activity to cognitive processes and ultimately
behavior.
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